Vietnam War ~ 1965.11 Battle of Ia Drang

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Vietnam War ~ 1965.11 Battle of Ia Drang

Background

By early 1965, the majority of rural South Vietnam was under limited Viet Cong (VC) control,
increasingly supported by Vietnam People's Army (PAVN) regulars from North Vietnam.
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) General William C. Westmoreland had secured
the commitment of upward of 300,000 U.S. regulars from President Lyndon B. Johnson
and a build-up of forces took place in the summer of 1965.

Viet Cong forces were in nominal control of most of the South Vietnamese countryside by
1965 and had established military infrastructure in the Central Highlands, to the northeast
of the Saigon region. Vietnamese communist forces had operated in this area during the
previous decade in the First Indochina War against the French, winning a notable victory
at the Battle of Mang Yang Pass in 1954.[12] There were few reliable roads into the area,
making it an ideal place for the communist forces to form bases, relatively immune from
attack by the generally road-bound ARVN forces. During 1965, large groups of North
Vietnamese Army regulars moved into the area to conduct offensive operations. Attacks
to the southwest from these bases threatened to cut South Vietnam in two.

By 1964 North Vietnam had established the B3 Front in the central highlands of South
Vietnam. By early November 1965 three PAVN regiments – the 32nd, 33rd and 66th –
and the H15 Local Force Battalion had been assembled in the area. The B3 Front
commander, Maj. Gen. Chu Huy Man, planned to target South Vietnamese positions
in the Kon Tum and Pleiku provinces. The city of Pleiku was the location of the South
Vietnamese II Corps headquarters, commanded by General Vinh Loc, who had at his
disposal nine South Vietnamese battalions; four ranger, three airborne and two marine.

The U.S. command saw this as an ideal area to test new air mobility tactics. Air mobility
called for battalion-sized forces to be delivered, supplied and extracted from an area of
action using helicopters. Since the heavy weapons of a normal combined-arms force
could not follow, the infantry would be supported by coordinated close air support,
artillery and aerial rocket fire, arranged from a distance and directed by local observers.
The new tactics had been developed in the U.S. by the 11th Air Assault Division (Test),
which was renamed as the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The division's troopers
dubbed themselves the "Air Cav" (Air Cavalry) and in July 1965 began deploying to
Camp Radcliff, An Khê, Vietnam. By November, most of the division's three brigade
s were ready for operations.

The U.S. deployment caused the B3 Field Front Command to bring forward an attack
on the U.S. Army Special Forces Plei Me camp, some 45 km southwest of Pleiku, which
was originally planned for December. The assault was instead launched October 19
with only two Regiments, the 32nd and 33rd, instead of the planned three, before the
Air Cavalry troops were combat ready. The plan was to attack the camp with the 33rd
Regiment while the 32nd Regiment would lie in wait to ambush the South Vietnamese
relief force that would inevitably be sent from Pleiku. Once the relief force was destroyed,
the two regiments were to join and take the camp.[18] The initial attack was repulsed
with the help of strong air support, and a small relief force reinforced the camp on the
morning of the 22nd. The main relief force, advancing south from Pleiku on route 6C,
was duly ambushed at 18:00 the next day. After a two-hour battle the ambushing
forces were beaten off, but the South Vietnamese, discouraged from moving any further,
set up a defensive position, and did not reach the camp at Plei Me until dusk on the 25th.
The North Vietnamese forces withdrew west towards the Chu Pong Massif.

At the end of October, after the siege of Plei Me was lifted, General Westmoreland ordered
General Kinnard to take his division on to the offensive and seize the initiative in Pleiku
province. Initial operations were conducted by 1st Brigade, and on November 1
they captured a North Vietnamese aid station south west of Plei Me. Further engagements
over the next few days revealed the arrival of the North Vietnamese 66th Regiment. Having
taken increasing casualties, 1st Brigade was relieved by 3rd Brigade, the handover being
completed over the period November 7–12.

On November 11, intelligence source revealed the disposition of the three NVA regiments:
the 66th at vicinity YA9104, the 33rd at YA 940010 and the 32nd at YA 820070.
On November 12, the 3rd Brigade was given orders by General Larsen, IFFV Commander
and General Knowles, 1st Air Cavalry Division Forward Headquarters Commander to
prepare for "an air assault near the foot of the Chu Pongs",[25] at 13°34′11″N
107°40′54″E, 14 miles (22 km) west of Plei Me.

On November 13, 3rd Brigade Commander Colonel Thomas W. Brown, acting following
the order issued by Gen. Larsen, IFFV Commander and Gen. Knowles, 1st Air Cavalry
Division Forward Command Post Commander, met with Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore
the commander of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, and told him "to conduct
an airmobile assault the following morning" and to conduct search and destroy
operations through 15 November. Meanwhile, an ARVN intelligence source by intercept
of radio communication indicated that some NVA B3 Field Front recon elements and
transportation units had already moved out of their assembly areas to attack the Pleime
camp.

Landing zones

Col. Brown selected Lt. Col. Moore and his men for the mission, with the explicit orders not
to attempt to scale the mountain. There were several clearings in the area that had been
designated as possible helicopter landing zones, typically named for a letter of the NATO
phonetic alphabet. Moore selected:

LZ X-Ray: at 13°34′4.6″N 107°42′50.4″E as his landing zone, a flat clearing surrounded
by low trees at the eastern base of the Chu Pong Massif and bordered by a dry creek bed
on the west. The Ia Drang River was about 2 km (1 mi) to the northwest.



LZ Albany: about 2.5 km (2 mi) to the northeast of X-Ray at 13°35′43″N 107°42′55″E

LZ Columbus: about 2.2 km (1 mi) east of Albany at 13°35′20.8″N 107°44′29″E

LZ Tango: about 2 km (1 mi) to the north of X-Ray at 13°35′28.8″N 107°42′46″E

LZ Yankee: a similar distance south of X-Ray at 13°33′14.1″N 107°43′1.3″E. LZ
Yankee was on sloping ground and could only fit about 6–8 helicopters at one time.

LZ Whiskey: 2.1 km (1 mi) south-east at 13°33′17.8″N 107°43′40.8″E

LZ Victor: at 13°33′33″N 107°43′47.8″E about 6 km (4 mi) to the south-southeast.

Artillery support would be provided from firebase "FB Falcon", about 8 km (5 mi) to the
northeast of X-Ray at 13°37′22″N 107°45′51″E.

General Knowles stated that he had selected the initial landing zone used by Hal Moore
and his troops,[28] knowing quite well that the enemy lacked anti-aircraft guns and
heavy mortars that had been destroyed during the attack on the Plei Me camp and
that the enemy could have positioned on the hillsides overlooking the landing zone to
gun down the helicopters and to decimate the cavalry troops landing on the ground.

LZ X-Ray was approximately the size of a misshapen football field, some 100 meters in
length (east to west). It was estimated that only eight UH-1 Hueys could fit in the
clearing at a given time. The 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry (1/7) was typical for U.S. Army
units of the time, consisting of three rifle companies and a heavy weapons company:
A-Alpha Company, B-Bravo Company, C-Charlie Company, and D-Delta Company...
about 450 men in total of the 765 of the battalion's authorized strength. They were
to be shuttled by 16 Huey transport helicopters, which could generally carry 10 to 12
equipped troopers, so the battalion would have to be delivered in several "lifts" carrying
just less than one complete company each time. Each lift would take about 30 minutes.
Lt. Col. Moore arranged the lifts to deliver Bravo Company first, along with his command
team, followed by Alpha and Charlie Companies, and finally Delta Company. Moore's
plan was to move Bravo and Alpha Companies northwest past the creek bed, and Charlie
Company south toward the mountain. Delta Company, which comprised special weapons
forces including mortar, recon, and machine gun units, was to be used as the battlefield
reserve. In the center of the LZ was a large termite hill that was to become Moore's
command post. Furthermore, the Bravo Company of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry
closed in at 18:00.


Landing zones
Day 1: Nov. 14, 1965
Landings
On November 14, an ARVN intelligence source by intercept of radio communication indicated
that before dawn, some assault elements of the NVA B3 Field Front started moving out of their
assembly areas to attack the Plei Me camp.

At 10:48, the first troops of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry (1/7) arrived at LZ X-Ray with
members of B Company touching down after about 30 minutes of bombardment via artillery,
aerial rockets, and air strikes. The troops were inserted about 200 meters from the position
of the NVA 9th Battalion belonging to the 66th Regiment.

The air assault insertion had the effect of causing the B3 Field Front to postpone the attack on
the Plei Me camp. B3 Field Front Command fell for the subterfuge, decided to postpone the
attack on Plei Me camp, and met the new threat with its 7th and 9th Battalions, while the
remaining units of its force were put on hold at their staging positions.

Accompanying Captain John Herren's B Company were Lt. Col. Moore and his 1st Battalion
command group. Instead of attempting to secure the entire landing zone with such a limited
force, most of B Company was kept near the center of the LZ as a strike force, while smaller
units were sent out to reconnoiter the surrounding area. Following their arrival, Capt. Herren
ordered B Company to move west past the creek bed. Within approximately 30 minutes, one
of his squads under Sgt. John Mingo surprised and captured an unarmed deserter of the 33rd
NVA Regiment. The prisoner revealed that there were three North Vietnamese Army battalions
on the Chu Pong Mountain – an estimated 1,600 North Vietnamese troops compared to fewer
than 200 American soldiers on the ground at that point. At 11:20, the second lift from the 1st
battalion arrived, with the rest of B Company and one platoon of Capt. Tony Nadal's A
Company. Fifty minutes later, the third lift arrived, consisting of the other two platoons of
A Company. A Company took up positions to the rear and left flank of B Company along the
dry creek bed, and to the west and to the south facing perpendicular down the creek bed.

At 12:15, the first shots were fired on the three platoons of B Company that were patrolling
the jungle northwest of the dry creek bed. Five minutes later, Capt. Herren ordered his 1st
Platoon under Lt. Al Devney and 2nd Platoon under Lt. Henry Herrick to advance abreast
of each other and the 3rd Platoon (under Lt. Dennis Deal) to follow as a reserve unit. Lt.
Devney's 1st Platoon led approximately 100 yards (91 m) west of the creek bed, with
Herrick's 2nd Platoon to his rear and right flank. Just before 13:00, Devney's 1st platoon
was heavily assaulted on both flanks by the North Vietnamese, taking casualties and
becoming pinned down in the process. It was  around this point that Lt. Herrick radioed
in that his 2nd Platoon were taking fire from their right flank, and that he was pursuing a
squad of communist forces in that direction.

Herrick's platoon is cut off

In pursuit of the North Vietnamese on his right flank, Lt. Herrick's 2nd Platoon, B Company,
was quickly spread out over a space of around 50 meters, and became separated from the
rest of 1/7 by approximately 100 meters. Soon, Lt. Herrick radioed in to ask whether he
should enter or circumvent a clearing that his platoon had come across in the bush. Lt.
Herrick expressed concerns that he might become cut off from the battalion if he tried to
skirt the clearing and therefore would be leading his men through it in pursuit of the enemy.
An intense firefight quickly erupted in the clearing; during the first three or four minutes his
platoon inflicted heavy losses on the North Vietnamese who streamed out of the trees, while
his men did not take any casualties. Lt. Herrick soon radioed in that the enemy were closing
in around his left and right flanks. Capt. Herren responded by ordering Lt. Herrick to attempt
to link back with Devney's 1st Platoon. Herrick replied that there was a large enemy force
between his men and 1st Platoon. The situation quickly disintegrated for Lt. Herrick's 2nd
Platoon, which began taking casualties as the North Vietnamese attack persisted. Herrick
ordered his men to form a defensive perimeter on a small knoll in the clearing. Within
approximately 25 minutes, five men of 2nd Platoon were killed, including Lt. Herrick who,
before dying, radioed Capt. Herren to report that he was hit and was passing command
over to Sgt. Carl Palmer, ordered the signals codes to be destroyed and artillery support to
be called in. 2nd Platoon was technically under the command of SFC Mac McHenry, but he
was positioned elsewhere on the perimeter. Sgts. Palmer and Robert Stokes were also dead,
leaving Sgt. Ernie Savage, 3rd Squad Leader, to assume by virtue of being close to the radio,
and proceeded to call in repeated artillery support around the 2nd Platoon's position.
By this point, eight men of the platoon had been killed and 13 wounded.


Under Sgt. Savage's leadership, and with the extraordinary care of the 2nd Platoon's medic
Charlie Lose, the platoon held the knoll for the duration of the battle at X-Ray. Spec. Galen
Bungum, 2nd Platoon, B Company, later said of the stand at the knoll: "We gathered up all
the full magazines we could find and stacked them up in front of us. There was no way we
could dig a foxhole. The handle was blown off my entrenching tool and one of my canteens
had a hole blown through it. The fire was so heavy that if you tried to raise up to dig you
were dead. There was death and destruction all around."[34]:117,118 Sgt. Savage later
recalled of the repeated NVA assaults: "It seemed like they didn't care how many of them
were killed. Some of them were stumbling, walking right into us. Some had their guns slung
and were charging bare-handed. I didn't run out of ammo – had about thirty magazines in
my pack. And no problems with the M16. An hour before dark three men walked up on the
perimeter. I killed all three of them 15 feet away."

Fight for the creek bed

With 2nd Platoon, B Company cut off and surrounded, the rest of 1/7 fought to maintain
a perimeter. At 13:32, C Company under Capt. Bob Edwards arrived, taking up positions
along the south and southwest facing the mountain. At around 13:45, through his
Operations Officer flying above the battlefield (Capt. Matt Dillon), Lt. Col. Moore called
in air strikes, artillery, and aerial rocket artillery on the mountain to prevent the North
Vietnamese from advancing on the battalion's position.

Lt. Bob Taft's 3rd Platoon, A Company, confronted approximately 150 Vietnamese soldiers
advancing down the length and sides of the creek bed (from the south) toward the battalion.
The platoon's troopers were told to drop their packs and move forward for the assault. The
resulting exchange was particularly costly for the platoon — its lead forces were quickly cut
down. 3rd Platoon was forced to pull back, and its leader Lt. Taft was killed. Sgt. Lorenzo
Nathan, a Korean War veteran, took command of 3rd Platoon which was able to halt the
NVA advance down the creek bed. The NVA forces shifted their attack to 3rd Platoon's right
flank in an attempt to flank B Company. Their advance was quickly stopped by Lt. Walter
"Joe" Marm's 2nd Platoon, A Company, situated on B Company's left flank. Lt. Col. Moore
had ordered Captain Nadal (A Company) to lend B Company one of his platoons, in an
effort to allow Capt. Herren (B Company) to attempt to fight through to Lt. Herrick's
(2nd Platoon, B Company) position. From Lt. Marm's (2nd Platoon, A Company) new
position, his men killed some 80 NVA troops with close range machine gun, rifle, and
grenade assault. The NVA survivors made their way back to the creek bed, where they
were cut down by fire from the rest of A Company. Lt. Taft's (3rd Platoon, A Company)
dog tags were discovered on the body of an NVA soldier who had been killed by Taft's
platoon. Upset that Lt. Taft's body had been left on the battlefield, Capt. Nadal
(A Company commander) and his radio operator, Sgt. Jack Gell, brought his and
the bodies of other Americans back to the creek bed under heavy fire.

Attack from the south

At 14:30 hours, the last troops of C Company (1/7) arrived, along with the lead elements of
D Company (1/7) under Capt. Ray Lefebvre. The insertion took place with intense NVA fire
pouring into the landing zone, and the Huey crews and newly arrived 1/7 troopers suffered
many casualties. The small contingent of D Company took up position on A Company's left
flank. C Company, assembled along the south and southwest in full strength, was met within
minutes by a head-on assault. C Company's commander, Capt. Edwards, radioed in that an
estimated 175 to 200 NVA troops were charging his company's lines. With a clear line of sight
over their sector of the battlefield, C Company was able to call in and adjust heavy ordnance
support with precision, inflicting devastating losses on the NVA forces. Many NVA soldiers were
burned to death as they scrambled from their bunkers in a hasty retreat, while others were
caught in a second barrage of artillery shells. By 15:00 the attack had been stopped, and one
hour after launching the assault the NVA forces withdrew.

Attack on Alpha and Delta Companies
At approximately the same time, A Company and the lead elements of D Company (which
had accompanied Alpha Company at the perimeter in the vicinity of the creek bed) were
subjected to a fierce NVA attack. Covering the critical left flank were two of A Company's
machine gun crews positioned 75 yards (70 m) southwest of the company's main position.
Spec. Theron Ladner (with his assistant gunner PFC Rodriguez Rivera) and Spec. 4 Russell
Adams (with his assistant gunner Spec. 4 Bill Beck) had positioned their guns 10 yards (9 m)
apart, and proceeded to pour heavy fire into the North Vietnamese forces attempting to
cut into the perimeter between C and A Companies. Lt. Col. Moore later credited the two gun
teams with preventing the NVA from rolling up Alpha Company and driving a wedge into the
battalion between Alpha and Charlie Companies. Spec. 4 Adams and Pfc. Rivera were severely
wounded in the attack. After the two were carried to the battalion's collection point at Lt. Col.
Moore's command post to await evacuation by air, Spec. 4 Beck, Spec. Ladner, and Pfc.
Edward Dougherty (an ammo bearer) continued their close range suppression of the
Vietnamese advance. Spec. 4 Beck later said of the battle: "When Doc Nall was there with
me, working on Russell, fear, real fear, hit me. Fear like I had never known before. Fear
comes, and once you recognize it and accept it, it passes just as fast as it comes, and
you don't really think about it anymore. You just do what you have to do, but you learn the
real meaning of fear and life and death. For the next two hours I was alone on that gun,
shooting at the enemy."

Delta Company's troopers also experienced heavy losses in repelling the NVA assault, and
Captain Lefebvre was wounded soon after arriving at LZ X-Ray. One of his platoon leaders,
Lt. Raul Taboada, was also severely wounded, and Capt. Lefebvre passed command of D
Company to SSgt. George Gonzales (who, unknown to Lefebvre, had also been wounded).
While medical evacuation helicopters (medevacs) were supposed to transport the battalion's
increasing numbers of casualties, they evacuated only two before the pilots called off their
mission under intense fire from the NVA. Casualties were loaded onto the assault Hueys (lifting
the battalion's forces to X-Ray), whose pilots carried load after load of wounded from the
battlefield. 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry's intelligence officer Capt. Tom Metsker (who had been
wounded) was fatally hit when helping Capt. Lefebvre aboard a Huey.

360-degree perimeter

Capt. Edwards (C Company) ordered SSgt. Gonzales who had been given command of D
Company by its commander, to position D Company on C Company's left flank, extending
the perimeter to cover the southeast side of X-Ray. At 15:20, the last of the 1st battalion
arrived, and Lt. Larry Litton assumed command of D Company. It was during this lift that
one Huey, having approached the landing zone too high, crash-landed on the outskirts of
the perimeter near the command post (those on board were quickly rescued by the
battalion). With Delta Company's weapons teams on the ground, its mortar units were
concentrated with the rest of the battalion's in a single station to support Alpha and Bravo
Companies. D Company's reconnaissance platoon (commanded by Lieutenant James
Rackstraw) was positioned along the north and east of the landing zone, establishing a
360-degree perimeter over X-Ray. Had the NVA forces circled around to the north of
the U.S. positions prior to this point, they would have found their approach unhindered.

Second push to the lost platoon
As the NVA attack on Alpha Company diminished, Lt. Col. Moore organized another effort
to rescue 2nd Platoon, B Company. At 15:45, Moore ordered Alpha Company and Bravo
Company to evacuate their casualties and pull back from engagement with the enemy.
Shortly after, Alpha and Bravo Companies began their advance from the creek bed toward
2nd Platoon, B Company and soon suffered casualties. At one point, B Company's advance
was halted by a firmly entrenched NVA machine-gun position at a large termite hill. Lt. Marm,
2nd Platoon, A Company, fired a light anti-tank weapon (LAW) at the machine-gun position,
charged the position with grenades while under fire, and killed the remaining NVA at the
machine-gun position with rifle fire. The following day, a dozen dead NVA troops (including
one officer) were found in the position. Lt. Marm was wounded in the neck and jaw in the
assault and was later awarded the Medal of Honor for his lone assault.[35] The second push
had advanced just over 75 yards (70 m) toward the lost platoon's position before being
stopped by the NVA. Alpha Company's 1st Platoon, leading the advance, was at risk of
becoming separated from the battalion, and at one point it was being engaged by an
American M60 machine gun that had been taken by the NVA from a dead 2nd Platoon
gunner. The impasse lasted between 20 and 30 minutes before Capts. Nadal (A
Company) and Herren (B Company) requested permission to withdraw back to X-Ray
(to which Moore agreed).

Americans dig in for the night
Near 17:00 hours, the lead elements of Bravo Company of 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry (2/7)
arrived at LZ X-Ray to reinforce the embattled 1st Battalion; the company closed in at 18:00
hours. In preparation for a defensive position to last the night, Lt. Col. Moore ordered Bravo
Company's commander Capt. Myron Diduryk to place two of his platoons between B/1/7
and D/1/7 on the northeast side of the perimeter. Capt. Diduryk's 2nd Platoon, B Company
(under Lt. James Lane), was used to reinforce C/1/7's position (which was stretched over a
disproportionately long line). By nightfall, the battle had taken a heavy toll on Lt. Col. Moore's
battalion (1/7): B company had taken 47 casualties (including one officer) and A Company
had taken 34 casualties (including three officers); C company had taken four casualties.

Around this time, Colonel Brown ordered the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry to be heli-lifted to LZ
Victor, at 5 kilometers from LZ X-Ray to be ready to reinforce the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry
and the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry the next morning.[37] The American forces were placed
on full alert throughout the night. Under the light of a bright moon, the North Vietnamese
probed every company on the perimeter (with the exception of D/1/7) in small squad-sized
units. The Americans exercised some level of restraint in their response. The M60 gun crews,
tactically positioned around the perimeter to provide for multiple fields of fire, were told to
hold their fire until otherwise ordered (so as to conceal their true location from the NVA).
Second Platoon of B Company (1/7) under the leadership of Sgt. Savage, suffered three
sizable assaults of the night (one just before midnight, one at 03:15, and one at 04:30).
The NVA, using bugles to signal their forces, were repelled from the knoll with artillery,
grenade, and rifle fire. Savage's "lost platoon" survived the night without taking
additional casualties.

At 18:50 hours, General Kinnard discussed with Gen Larsen the possibility of having a B-52
strike at the area of LZ X-Ray. At 21:00 hours: 1st Air Cavalry selected coordinates for
B-52 strike in Code – YA 870000, YA 830000, YA 830070, YA 870070 with alternative
targets (in Code) YA 8607, YA 9007, YA 9000, YA 8600.

Day 2: Nov. 15
Attack at dawn
At 06:00 hours: J3/MACV notified 1st Air Cavalry that the time over target of the B-52
strike is set for 16:00 hours.

Just before dawn at 06:20, Lt. Col. Moore ordered his battalion's companies to put out
reconnaissance patrols to probe for North Vietnamese forces. At 06:50, patrols from
Charlie Company's 1st Platoon (under Lt. Neil Kroger) and 2nd Platoon (under Lt. John
Geoghegan) had advanced 150 yards (140 m) from the perimeter before coming into
contact with NVA troops. A firefight broke out, and the patrols quickly withdrew to the
perimeter. Shortly after, an estimated 200-plus NVA troops charged 1st and 2nd
Platoons of C Company on the south side of the perimeter. Heavy ordnance support
was called in, but the NVA were soon within 75 yards (70 m) of the 1st Battalion's lines.
Their fire began to cut through Charlie Company's positions and into the command post
and the American lines across the LZ. 1st and 2nd platoons suffered significant casualties
in this assault, including Lts. Kroger and Geoghegan. Lt. Geoghegan was killed while
attempting to rescue one of his wounded men, Pfc. Willie Godboldt (who died of his
wounds shortly thereafter). Two M60 crews (under Spec. James Comer and Spec.
4s Clinton Poley, Nathaniel Byrd, and George Foxe) were instrumental in preventing
the North Vietnamese advance from completely overrunning Lt. Geoghegan's lines.
Following this attack, Charlie Company's 3rd Platoon under Lt. William Franklin came
under NVA assault. C Company's commander, Capt. Edwards was seriously wounded,
and Lt. John Arrington assumed command of the company and was himself wounded
while receiving instructions from Edwards. C Company's command then passed to
Platoon Sgt. Glenn A. Kennedy. Lt. Franklin was also seriously wounded. The battalion
was being attacked in two directions.

Three-pronged attack
At 07:45, the NVA launched an assault on Crack Rock, near its connection with the
beleaguered C/1/7. Enemy fire started to hit the 1st Battalion command post, which
suffered one medic killed and several other troops wounded (including one of Lt. Col.
Moore's own radio operators, Spec. 4 Robert Ouellette). Under heavy attack on three
sides, the battalion fought off repeated waves of NVA infantry. It was during this battle
that Spec. Willard Parish of Charlie Company, situated on Delta Company's lines,
earned a Silver Star for suppressing an intense NVA assault in his sector. After expending
his M60 ammunition, Parish resorted to his .45 sidearm to repel NVA forces that
advanced within 20 yards (18 m) of his foxhole. After the battle, more than 100 dead
NVA troops were discovered around his position.

As the battle along the southern line intensified, Lt. Charlie W. Hastings (U.S. Air Force liaison
forward air controller), was instructed by Lt. Col. Moore (based on criteria established by
the Air Force.) to transmit the code phrase "Broken Arrow", which relayed that an American
combat unit was in danger of being overrun. In so doing, Lt. Hastings was calling on
all available support aircraft in South Vietnam to come to the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry's
defense, drawing on a significant arsenal of heavy ordnance support. On Charlie Company's
broken lines, NVA troops walked the lines for several minutes, killing wounded Americans and
stripping their bodies of weapons and other items. It was around this time, at 07:55, that Lt.
Col. Moore ordered his men to throw colored smoke grenades to mark the battalion
perimeter. Aerial fire support was then called in on the NVA at close range – including
those along Charlie Company's lines. Shortly after, Lt. Col. Moore's command post was
subjected to a friendly fire incident by two F-100 Super Sabre dropping napalm. Seeing
the approaching F-100's about to drop their bombs dangerously close to the American
positions, Lt. Hastings frantically radioed them to abort the attack and change course.
The pilot of the second F-100 complied and disengaged, but the ordnance from the
first F-100 had already been dropped. Despite Lt. Hastings' best efforts, several
American soldiers were wounded or killed by this air strike. News reporter Joe
Galloway, who helped carry one of the badly wounded men (who died two days
later) to an aid station, tried to attach a name to the death occurring around him,
discovering that this particular soldier's name was Pfc. Jimmy Nakayama of Rigby,
Idaho who had been a 2nd Lt. in the National Guard. Galloway would later share
how that same week Nakayama became a father. Galloway also noted "[a]t LZ
XRay 80 men died and 124 were wounded, many of them terribly", and that the
death toll for the entire battle was 234 Americans killed and perhaps as many as
2,000 North Vietnamese soldiers.

At 08:00, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry set out on foot from LZ-Victor to reinforce
LZ X-Ray.

At 09:10, the first elements of Alpha Company (2/7), under Capt. Joel Sugdinis, arrived
at X-Ray. Capt. Sugdinis's forces reinforced the survivors of Charlie Company (1/7). By
10:00, the North Vietnamese had begun to withdraw from the battle, although sporadic
fire still continued to harass the Americans. Charlie Company, having inflicted scores of
losses on the NVA, had suffered 42 killed in action (KIA) and 20 wounded in action (WIA)
over the course of the 2 1/2-hour assault. Lt. Rick Rescorla a platoon leader of Capt.
Diduryk's Bravo Company (2/7) after having policed up the battlefield in Charlie
Company's sector following the assaults, later remarked: "There were American
and NVA bodies everywhere. My area was where Lt. Geoghegan's platoon (2nd
Platoon, C Company) had been. There were several dead NVA around his platoon
command post. One dead trooper was locked in contact with a dead NVA, hands
around the enemy's throat. There were two troopers – one black, one Hispanic
– linked tight together. It looked like they had died trying to help each other."

At 09:30, Col. Brown, the commander of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile),
landed at LZ X-Ray to make preparation to withdraw the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry,
deeming its job done.[44] He intended to establish a 3rd Air Cavalry Brigade forward
command post in order to take over the command of the battlefield with the presence
of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, and the 2nd Battalion,
5th Cavalry on the ground at LZ X-Ray. When Moore refused to relinquish the command
of his battalion, Brown contented to notify him before leaving that the 1st Battalion,
7th Cavalry would be withdrawn the next day.

Reinforcements
Given the tempo of combat at LZ X-Ray and the losses being suffered, other units of the
1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) planned to land nearby and then move overland to X-Ray.
The 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry (2/5), was to be flown into LZ Victor, about 3.5 kilometers
east-southeast of LZ X-Ray. 2/5 flew in at 08:00 and quickly organized to move out, the
trip taking about 4 hours. Most of this was uneventful until they were approaching X-Ray.
At about 10:00, some 800 yards (730 m) to the east of the LZ, Alpha Company (2/7)
received some light fire and had to set up a combat front. At 12:05, Lt. Col Tully's 2/5
troopers had arrived at the LZ.

Because the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry stealthily closed in the battlefield by foot instead
of by heli-lift, B3 Field Front was unaware that the opponent troop ratio had switched
from 2:2 to 3:2.

At 10:30 hours: General DePuy, J3/MACV called Colonel Barrow to make sure that the
B-52 had been cleared with General Vĩnh Lộc, Commander General II Corps and if the
elements of 1st Cavalry had received the TOT 16:00 hours restriction and would
comply.

Third push to the lost platoon

Using a plan devised by Lt. Col. Moore, Lt. Col. Tully (2/5) commanded B/1/7, A/2/5, and
C/2/5 in a third major effort to relieve the lost B Company platoon of 1/7 under Sgt. Ernie
Savage. Making use of fire support, the relief force slowly made its way to the knoll without
encountering NVA fighters. 2nd Platoon, B Company had survived but at great cost; out
of the 29 men, 9 were KIA and 13 WIA. At around 15:30, the relief force started to
encounter sniper fire and began carrying the wounded and dead of the lost platoon
back to X-Ray. The expanded force at X-Ray, consisting of Moore's weakened 1/7,
one company of 2/7, and Tully's 2/5, consolidated at X-Ray for the night. At the LZ,
the wounded and dead were evacuated, and the remaining American forces dug in and
fortified their lines.

At precisely 16:00, the first wave of B-52 carpet bombings fell at YA 8702 (about 7 kilometers
west of LZ X-Ray), aiming mainly to strike the units of the 32nd Regiment that were located
about 5 kilometers further west and would carry on for 5 consecutive days.[46] Lt. Col.
Nguyễn Hữu An was on his way from his forward command post to the LZ X-Ray to meet
with Lã Ngọc Châu, 7th Battalion interim Commander, when he first saw the waves of B-52
carpet bombings raining down.[5] Air Cavalry units at the scene reported seeing three .50
caliber machine gun positions firing at the aircraft that were directly in path of strike. General
DePuy, J3/MACV, who executed this B-52 airstrike stated that "this is the fastest a strike of
this nature had ever been laid-on."

At 16:30, Brigadier General Knowles, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Forward CP Commander
, landed at the LZ X-Ray to announce the withdrawal of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry set for
the next day.

At 20:40 hours, 1st Air Cavalry requested for second B-52 strike with primary targets set for
YA 830050, YA 850050, YA 843000 and alternate set for YV 890980, YV 910980, YV 890950,
YV 910950.[\

Around midnight, Lt. Colonel Moore received from Lt. Colonel Edward C. (Shy) Meyer, 3rd
Brigade executive officer, a message saying that General William Westmoreland's headquarters
wanted him to "leave X-Ray early the next morning for Saigon to brief him and his staff on
the battle." He vehemently objected to the order and was allowed to remain with his battalion
until its withdrawal planned for the next morning.

Day 3: Nov. 16
The American lines at X-Ray were harassed during the night of 15 November by NVA probes.
Shortly before 04:00 of the third day grenade booby traps and trip flares set by Capt.
Diduryk's Bravo Company (2/7) began to erupt. At 04:22 the NVA launched a fierce assault
against Diduryk's men. Bravo fought off this attack by an estimated 300 NVA in minutes. A
decisive factor in this stand, in addition to rifle and machine gun fire from B Company's lines,
was the skilled placement of artillery strikes by Diduryk's forward observer, Lt. Bill Lund.
Making use of four artillery batteries, Lund organized fire into separate concentrations along
the battlefield with devastating consequences for the waves of advancing NVA.

The NVA repeated their assault on Diduryk's lines 20 minutes after the first attack as flares
dropped from American C-123 Provider aircraft illuminated the battlefield to B Company's
advantage. For around 30 minutes B Company fought off the NVA advance with a
combination of small arms and Lt. Lund's skilled organization of artillery strikes. Shortly after
05:00 a third attack was launched against B Company, which was repelled by Lt. James
Lane's platoon within 30 minutes. At almost 06:30 the NVA launched a fourth attack on
Diduryk's men – this time in the vicinity of B Company's command post. Again, Lt. Lund's
precision in ordering artillery strikes cut down scores of NVA soldiers, while Diduryk's men
repelled those who survived using rifle and machine gun fire. At the end of these attacks,
with daybreak approaching, Diduryk's Company had only six lightly wounded men among
its ranks – with none killed.

LZ X-Ray secured
At 08:30, Gen. DePuy asked Gen. Knowles if he had plans for exploitation of yesterday's
strike, and if he had plan to commit another battalion for a total of 5 – besides the 1/7,
2/7, 2/5 and 1/9 Air Cav Battalions in the area.

At 09:15, General Knowles wanted the cavalry units on the ground to organize an
exploitation of B-52 strike target operation. Lt. Col. Moore responded that he had
plans to send in 1st Cav, however at the present time all units are engaged.

Around 10:30 a.m., 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry received orders to withdraw from the battle
zone while 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry and 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry took up defensive
positions for the night. The intention was to reassure the NVA side in seeing that the
opponent troop ratio was reverting to 2:2. According to the assessment of ARVN Gen.
Nguyen Vinh Loc, at the LZ X-Ray battle, the NVA did not have anti-aircraft weapons and
heavy mortars and had to resort to "human wave" tactics: "The enemy has lost nearly
all their heavy crew-served weapons during the first phase ... Their tactics relied mostly
on the 'human waves.'"

The battle was ostensibly over. The NVA forces had suffered hundreds of casualties and
were no longer capable of a fight. U.S. forces had suffered 79 killed and 121 wounded
and had been reinforced to levels that would guarantee their safety. Given the situation
there was no reason for U.S. forces to stay in the field, their mission was complete and
a success. Moreover, Col. Brown (3rd Brigade commander), in overall command, was
worried about reports that additional NVA units were moving into the area over the
border. He wanted to withdraw the units but Gen. Westmoreland demanded that the
2/7 and 2/5 stay at X-Ray to avoid the appearance of a retreat.

The U.S. reported the bodies of 634 NVA soldiers were found in the vicinity. The U.S.
estimated that 1,215 NVA were killed a distance away by artillery and airstrikes. Six NVA
were captured.[49] Six PAVN crew-served weapons and 135 individual weapons were
captured, and an estimated 75–100 weapons were destroyed.[50] The normal ratio
of enemy soldiers killed to weapons captured as later established by the Department
of Defense was 3 or 4 to one.

At 16:25H, 1st Air Cavalry TOC made an Arclight request for YV 932985, YV 936996,
YA 898005, YA 898019 with TOT 13:00 hours, not later than 17:00 hours. At 18:50H,
II Corp Commanding General concurred with the Arclite request.

Around 20:25H, General DePuy finalized the plan to have B-52 bombers strike the LZ
X-Ray the next day by noon. He got the assurance from Col Brown that the friendly
troops had enough lead time and will meet the 3 km safety limits by then.

At 12:53H, Gen. Westmoreland called and wanted to know if the Cavalry have enough
air support and if the troops were fine.

LZ Albany
Day 4: Nov. 17

At 09:00H, 1st Air Cavalry TOC submitted an Arc light request to J3/MACV for 1300 TOT
tomorrow 18 November; priority 1. 9201-9401-9208-9408, priority 2. 9009-9209-9006
-9206, priority 3. 8306-8506-8303-8503.

Meanwhile, the two remaining battalions abandoned LZ X-Ray and began a tactical march
to new landing zones. Lt. Col. Bob Tully, commanding the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, went
to LZ Columbus about 4 km (2 mi) to the northeast, and Lt. Col. Robert McDade,
commanding the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, went to LZ Albany about 4 km (2 mi) to
the north-northeast, close to the Ia Drang. Tully's men moved out at 09:00; McDade's
followed 10 minutes later.[34] U.S. Air Force B-52 Stratofortresses were on their way
from Guam, and their target for the third day of bombing was the slopes of the Chu
Pong massif and LZ X-Ray itself. The U.S. ground forces had to move outside a 2-mile
(3 km) safety zone by midmorning to be clear of the bombardment.[54] With the two
remaining battalions quietly abandoning the landing zone by land instead of by
helicopters to make way for the B-52 strike any NVA troops of the 7th and 9th
Battalions at the vacated X-Ray area were caught by surprise.

Events leading to an ambush
The first indication of enemy presence was observed by the reconnaissance platoon's point
squad, leading the American column. SSgt. Donald J. Slovak, the squad leader, saw "Ho Chi
Minh sandal foot markings, bamboo arrows on the ground pointing north, matted grass and
grains of rice."[34]:285,286 After marching about 2,000 meters, Alpha Company (1/7)
leading 2/7, headed northwest, while 2/5 continued on to LZ Columbus. Alpha Company
came upon some grass huts, which they were directed to burn. At 11:38, Lt. Col. Tully's
men of 2/5, were logged into its objective, LZ Columbus. Communist troops in the area
consisted of elements the 8th Battalion, 66th Regiment, 1st Battalion, 33rd Regiment NVA
and the headquarters of the 3rd Battalion, 33rd Regiment. The 33rd Regiment's battalions
were under strength from casualties incurred during the battle at the U.S. Army Special
Forces Plei Me camp, the 8th Battalion was General Chu Huy Man's reserve battalion, fresh
and rested.

The elements of the two NVA battalions that were involved in the clash with the Air Cavalry
troops were: 1st Company/1st Battalion/33rd Regiment, 2nd Company/1st Battalion/33rd
Regiment, 6th Company/8th Battalion/66th Regiment, 7th Company/8th Battalion/66th
Regiment and 8th Company/8th Battalion/66th Regiment. While the 2nd Battalion, 7th
Cavalry was moving up northwest toward the position of 1st Battalion CP/33rd Regiment
nested at the east side of Ia Drang river, the 8th Company/8th Battalion/66th Regiment
marched down southeast along the Ia Drang river, and the 6th Company/8th
Battalion/66th Regiment and 7th Company/8th Battalion/66th Regiment marched down
on a collusion path toward the Air Cavalry unit.[56] The 8th Battalion was led by Lê Xuân
Phối.

Alpha Company noticed the sudden absence of air cover and their commander, Capt.
Joel Sugdinis, wondered where the aerial rocket artillery choppers were. He soon heard
the sound of distant explosions to his rear; the B-52s were making their bombing runs
on the Chu Pong massif. Lt. D. P. (Pat) Payne, the recon platoon leader, was walking
around some termite hills when he suddenly came upon an NVA soldier resting on the
ground. Payne jumped on the NVA trooper and took him prisoner. Simultaneously,
about 10 yards away, his platoon sergeant captured a second NVA soldier. Other
members of the NVA recon team may have escaped and reported to the headquarter
s of the 1st Battalion, 33rd Regiment. The NVA then began to organize an assault on
the American column. As word of the capture reached him, Lt. Col. McDade ordered
a halt as he went forward from the rear of the column to interrogate the prisoners
personally. The two captured NVA soldiers were policed up about 100 yards from
the southwestern edge of the clearing called Albany, the report of which reached
division forward at Pleiku at 11:57.

Lt. Col. McDade then called his company commanders of 2/7 forward for a conference;
most of whom were accompanied by their radio operators. Alpha Company moved forward
to LZ Albany; McDade and his command group were with them. Following orders, the other
company commanders were moving forward to join Lt. Col. McDade. Delta Company,
which was next in the column following Alpha Company, was holding in place; so was Charlie
Company, which was next in line. Second Battalion Headquarters Company followed, and
Alpha Company, 1/5, brought up the rear of the column. The American column was
halted in unprepared, open terrain, and strung out in 550-yard (500 m) line of march.
Most of the units had flank security posted but the men were worn out from almost 60
hours without sleep and four hours of marching. The elephant grass was chest-high so
visibility was limited. The radios for air or artillery support were with the company
commanders.

An hour and 10 minutes after the NVA recon soldiers were captured, Alpha Company and Lt.
Col. McDade's command group had reached the Albany clearing. McDade and his group
walked across the clearing and into a clump of trees. Beyond that clump of trees was
another clearing. The remainder of the battalion was in a dispersed column to the east
of the LZ. Battalion SgtMaj. James Scott and Sgt. Charles Bass then attempted to
question the prisoners again. While they were doing this, Bass heard Vietnamese voices
and the interpreter confirmed that these were NVA talking. Alpha Company had been in
the LZ about five minutes and about then, small arms fire began.

2nd Battalion ambushed
Lt. Pat Payne's reconnaissance platoon had walked to within 200 yards (180 m) of the
headquarters of the NVA's 3rd Battalion, 33rd Regiment; the 550 men of the 8th Battalion,
66th Regiment had been bivouacked to the northeast of the American column. As the
Americans rested in the tall grass, NVA soldiers were coming toward them by the hundreds.
It was 13:15. The close quarters battle lasted for 16 hours. North Vietnamese
forces first struck at the head of 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry's column and rapidly spread
down the right or east side of the column in an L-shaped ambush. NVA troops ran down
the length of the column, with units peeling off to attack the outnumbered American soldiers,
engaging in hand-to-hand combat.

The 6th Company/8th Battalion/66th Regiment made contact head on with 2nd Battalion,
7th Cavalry, the 1st Company/1st Battalion/33rd Regiment and 2nd Company/1st
Battalion/33rd Regiment maneuvered eastward and attacked the lower and upper flanks
respectively and the 8th Company/8th Battalion/66th Regiment switched its direction
north-westward and attacked the Air Cavalry from behind. McDade's command
group made it into the clump of trees between the two clearings of LZ Albany. They
took cover from rifle and mortar fire within the trees and termite hills. The reconnaissance
platoon and 1st Platoon, Alpha Company, provided initial defense at the position. By 13:26,
they had been cut off from the rest of the column; the area whence they had come was full
of NVA soldiers. While they waited for air support, the Americans holding LZ Albany drove
off any NVA assaults on them and sniped at the exposed enemy wandering around the
perimeter. It was later discovered that the NVA were mopping up, looking for wounded
American soldiers in the tall grass and killing them.

All the while the noise of battle could be heard in the woods as the other companies fought.
The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry had been reduced to a small perimeter at Albany composed
of survivors of Alpha Company, the recon platoon, survivors from the destroyed Charlie and
Delta Companies and the command group. There was also a smaller perimeter at the rear of
the column about 500–700 yards due south: Capt. George Forrest's Alpha Company, 1st
Battalion, 5th Cavalry. Capt. Forrest had run a gauntlet all the way from the conference
called by Lt. Col. McDade back to his company when the NVA mortars started coming in.
Charlie and Alpha companies lost 70 men in the first few minutes. Charlie Company suffered
45 dead and more than 50 wounded, the heaviest casualties of any unit that fought on
Albany. USAF A-1E Skyraiders soon provided support by dropping napalm bombs, but
because of the fog of war and the inter-mixing of American and NVA troops, it is likely
that air and artillery strikes killed NVA and American soldiers indiscriminately.

American reinforcements arrive
At 12:00, B-52 bombers struck the areas further up north of LZ Albany and a battle
damage assessment (BDA) was conducted by elements of the Cavalry in the afternoon.
At 14:55, Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry under Capt. Buse Tully began marching
from LZ Columbus to the rear of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry column that was about 2
miles (3 km) away. By 16:30, they came into contact with the Alpha Company (1/5)
perimeter under Capt. Forrest. A one-helicopter landing zone was secured and the wounded
were evacuated. Capt. Tully's men in 2/5 then began to push forward toward where the
rest of the ambushed column would be. NVA troopers contested their advance and the
Americans came under fire from a wood line. Tully's men assaulted the tree line and drove
off the North Vietnamese. At 18:25, orders were received to secure into a two-company
perimeter for the night. They planned to resume the advance at daybreak.

At around 16:00, Capt. Myron Diduryk's Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry,
veterans of the fight at LZ X-Ray, got the word that they would be deployed in the
battalion's relief. At 18:45 the first helicopters swept over the Albany clearing and the
troopers deployed into the tall grass. Lt. Rick Rescorla, the sole remaining
platoon leader in Bravo Company, led the reinforcements into the Albany perimeter,
which was expanded to provide better security. The wounded at Albany were evacuated
at around 22:30 that evening, the helicopters receiving intense ground fire as they
landed and took off. The Americans at Albany then settled down for the night.

Day 5: Nov. 18
As Friday, Nov. 18, dawned on the battlefield, U.S. soldiers began to gather up their dead
comrades. This task took the better part of two days, as American and NVA dead were
scattered all over the field of battle. Rescorla described the scene as, "a long, bloody traffic
accident in the jungle."[34]:369 While securing the battlefield, Rescorla recovered a large
, battered, old French army bugle from a dying NVA soldier. The American soldiers finally
left LZ Albany for LZ Crooks at 13°40′5.6″N 107°39′10″E, six miles (10 km) away, on
Nov. 19. The battle at LZ Albany cost the United States Army 155 men killed or missing
and 124 wounded.[34]:295 One U.S. soldier, Toby Braveboy, was recovered on Nov.
24 when he waved down a passing H-13 scout helicopter.[34]:352–354 About half of
the approximately 300 American deaths in the 35 days of Operation Silver Bayonet
occurred in this 16-hour fight.[60] The United States reported 403 NVA troops were
killed in this battle and an estimated 150 were wounded, probably a large overestimation.
Weapons captured included 112 rifles, 33 light machine-guns, three heavy machine-guns,
two rocket launchers and four mortars.

Effect and aftermath

On the last day of the battle (November 18), General Westmoreland and General Cao Van
Vien, visited the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry. They were briefed by Lt. Col. Moore about the
battle at LZ X-Ray. Westmoreland told them they were being recommended for a
Presidential Unit Citation. They then flew to the 3rd Air Cavalry Brigade commanded by Col.
Brown who gave them a briefing and they flew over the operation area. Before leaving Pleiku,
they also had a meeting with General Vinh Loc, II Corps Commander and General Larsen,
IFFV Commander who were involved in the battle at corps level. In this session, with Col.
Brown's presence, they reviewed and agreed that the execution of the Battle of Ia Drang
was in line with the National Campaign Plan developed by General Thang and General
DePuy, the two J-3's of the JGS and MACV. They then flew to Qui Nhơn and went to
the hospital to visit the troops of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry who were wounded
in the LZ Albany engagement. After the battle, General Westmoreland instructed
his J2 and J3 Chiefs to gain more improvements and "to bring a B-52 strike down
within seven hours after acquiring suitable intelligence".

As the fight at LZ Albany was coming to an end, the ARVN II Corps Command decided to
"finish off" the campaign by introducing the ARVN Airborne Brigade into the battlefield on
Nov. 17 with the establishment of a new artillery support base at LZ Crooks, secured by
the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry.[65] The 5-day B-52 airstrike operation were carried on for
two more days: on November 19, the carpet bombing aimed at the positions of units of
the 66th and 33rd Regiments;[66] and on November 20, units of the 32nd Regiment.
The ARVN Airborne Brigade pursued the two remaining 635th and 334th Battalions of the
320th Regimens and executed two ambushes: the first on Nov. 20 at the north side
and the second on Nov. 24 on the south side of the Ia Drang River. On Nov. 26,
witnessing no further contact, the ARVN withdrew from the area.

A 1966 NVA Central Highlands Front report claimed that in five major engagements with
U.S. forces, NVA forces suffered 559 soldiers killed and 669 wounded. NVA histories claim
the United States suffered 1,500 to 1,700 casualties during the Ia Drang Campaign. The
U.S. military confirmed 305 killed and 524 wounded (including 234 killed and 242 wounded
between Nov. 14 and 18, 1965), and claimed 3,561 NVA were killed and more than 1,000
were wounded during engagements with the 1st Cavalry Division troops.

According to ARVN intelligence sources, each of the three NVA regiments' initial strength
was 2,200 soldiers: 1st Battalion-500, 2nd Battalion-500, 3rd Battalion-500, Mortar
Company-150, Anti-Aircraft Company-150, Signal Company-120, Transportation
Company-150, Medical Company-40, Engineer Company-60, Recon Company-50.

ARVN's II Corps Command recapitulates the losses of the NVA from 18 Oct. to 26 Nov.
as follows: KIA (bc) 4,254, KIA (est) 2,270, WIA 1293, CIA 179, weapons (crew served)
169, (individual) 1,027. NVA casualty figures advanced by II Corps Command relied
especially on NVA regimental command posts' own loss reports (as indicated by Maj.
Gen. Kinnard), intercepted by ARVN radio listening stations. Furthermore, they include
NVA troop casualties caused by the 5-day Arc Light airstrike that the NVA and U.S. sides
fail to take into account.

As the outcome of the entire campaign, the ARVN claimed that the NVA were unable to
achieve their objectives of overrunning the camp and destroying the relief column at
Plei Me, which is confirmed in the B3 Front commander's account, as well as that the
entire B3 Field Force strength had been wiped out and the survivors pushed over the
Cambodian border.

This battle can be seen as a blueprint for tactics by both sides. The Americans used air
mobility, artillery fire and close air support to accomplish battlefield objectives. The NVA
learned that they could neutralize that firepower by quickly engaging American forces at
very close range. North Vietnamese Col. Nguyễn Hữu An included his lessons from the
battle at X-ray in his orders for Albany, "Move inside the column, grab them by the belt,
and thus avoid casualties from the artillery and air."[75] Both Westmoreland and An
thought this battle to be a success. This battle was one of the few set piece battles of
the war and was one of the first battles to popularize the U.S. concept of the "body
count" as a measure of success, as the U.S. claimed that the kill ratio was nearly 10 to 1.
The vast majority of casualties inflicted on US forces was through small-arms and
light-mortar fire, with Lt. Col. Moore noting the NVA/PAVN's accurate shooting,
well-placed ambushes and coordinated targeting of officers and overwhelmed US
positions in small-unit tactics[76] On the other hand, US forces had emerged from
the battle by inflicting casualties through B-52 strikes, aerial rockets and artillery
and relying on overwhelming firepower.

Both sides probably inflated the estimates of their opponent's casualties. Lewy states
that, according to DOD officials, US "body count" claims of communist casualties were
inflated at least 30 percent for the Vietnam War as a whole. The U.S. claim of 403
North Vietnamese battle dead at Landing Zone Albany seems an overestimate. Lt.
Col. McDade (2/7) later claimed he did not report any estimate of North Vietnamese
casualties at LZ Albany and had not seen even 200 bodies of North Vietnamese
soldiers. Similarly, Lt. Col. Moore also acknowledged that the NVA casualty figures in the
fight at LZ X-Ray were inaccurate. He lowered the original body count figure of 834
submitted by his men to 634, considering the former number was too high.

In the late 1940s, Gen. Võ Nguyên Giáp wrote about the Việt Minh war against the
French: "The enemy will pass slowly from the offensive to the defensive. The blitzkrieg
will transform itself into a war of long duration. Thus, the enemy will be caught in a
dilemma: He has to drag out the war in order to win it and does not possess, on the
other hand, the psychological and political means to fight a long-drawn-out war." After
this battle, he said: "We thought that the Americans must have a strategy. We did.
We had a strategy of people's war. You had tactics, and it takes very decisive tactics
to win a strategic victory... If we could defeat your tactics — your helicopters — then
we could defeat your strategy. Our goal was to win the war."

Commenting later on the battle, Harold (Hal) G. Moore said, The "peasant soldiers [of North
Vietnam] had withstood the terrible high-tech fire storm delivered against them by a
superpower and had at least fought the Americans to a draw. By their yardstick, a draw
against such a powerful opponent was the equivalent of a victory."